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1 Introduction
e-Health is a ”system defined as the healthcare practice supported by electronic
processes and communication”[23]. There are numerous high quality e-health
platforms available like Mediboard [26], THIRRA[25], that aim to provide access
to available heath related data which can be accessible from anywhere. These
systems allow medical users to create medical cases for individual patients and
share them with other medical users for consultation.
Many of the currently existing e-Health systems offer easy storage and access
to health record from virtually any device [2]. Additionally they allow to explic-
itly share specific information in the health record, or the complete information
with different users or groups. For example, the Microsoft HealthVault [24] al-
lows access to either the complete record or part of the record by another user
if authorization has been granted. This would allow medical professionals to
share patient records securely with other professionals. Figure A.1 in Appendix
shows an example how a medical professional accesses the medical record in an
e-Health system.
e-Health systems store health-related data to allow development of an effec-
tive medical treatment plan. However there is the important issue of protecting
the confidentiality of patients as any disclosure may result in personal and fi-
nancial losses as well as violation of data protection laws such as the European
Union’s Directive 2011/24/EU on patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare[3]
or HiPAA[4].
We propose and analyse a system for access to these records that allows
the data to be encrypted in the web browser. Using the web browser makes it
possible to access the data from any device connected to internet. This data
cannot be decrypted on the server or by the anyone at the data storage centre
but can only be decrypted by the end users. Additionally, our system also
allows for changing the encryption key without violating the confidentiality of
the data, which we haven’t seen in any other system.
2 Security and Requirements
2.1 Threat Model
The proposed security model should allow the user access the secured data using
only the self-chosen password, which means the most vulnerable point of this
model is the server which stores the wrapped key of the user derived key. In
general, attacks can be categorized into a few different groups:
• Network Eavesdropping
All the connections from server to device are assumed to be using SSL/TLS.
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Since all connections will be over SSL/TLS, the channel would be pro-
tected against passive eavesdroppers.
• Man-in-the-middle (MITM)
Using SSL/TLS does not prevent against active adversaries. Active ad-
versaries can forge an identity and also tamper with the messages passed
between the user and server. Since the user device may not have ade-
quate information to establish to identity of the server, this would lead
to the adversary being able to read and even change the communication
exchanges between server and user by impersonating the legitimate server
or vice-versa.
• Storage Server
The biggest threat is the cloud/server that holds the Key-Cipher (KC)
along with other information such as user-id and the associated crypto-
graphic data, both of which can be used by potential adversary to derive
the user-password and thus by extension the derived key. This type of
access to server can only be possible for IT administrators, someone who
has successfully managed to access it or the back-up copy of the data.
• Social Aspect
Another threat for the system is the human factor i.e. users or admins of
the server who can be forced/blackmailed to hand over the copy of data
or of the backup disk.
Ideally, in the model, these attacks are only possible when the adversary has
knowledge of the parameters of the key derivation function, the salt and a pair
of ciphertext and its corresponding plaintext, which itself is a highly impossible
task. Nevertheless when evaluating the security of the proposed model, it is
being assumed that the adversary had already completed this impossible task.
2.2 Requirements
We define some security requirements that needs to be satisfied by an ideal
e-Health system, namely:
1. Confidentiality: All the data must be kept absolutely secure from all ad-
versaries including the server itself.
2. Integrity: The operation of encryption and decryption on the data should
be possible without requiring to relay on any third party.
3. Authorized sharing: Data shared by one user must be read only by users
that are explicitly authorized.
4. Usability: The security of the system must not decrease the usability
of the system. It should have the functionality of recovering forgotten
password or changing of password without violating other requirements of
the system.
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3 Related Work
The medical data is always encrypted on the user’s device using a password
known by the user, while the server only acts as an encrypted data storage
space. All the operations of the system take place on the user end, which per-
forms all encryption and decryption, sending the encrypted data to server and
sharing it with other users or groups only when permitted.
The server is never able to read the decrypted data; even if an adversary
gets access to server, he cannot recover the plaintext without big computational
efforts to brute-force through every user’s possible decryption key. In order to
understand the current implementation of similar systems, we studied some of
the current secure storage-based applications. These applications/systems were
categorized under two sections: cloud-based encryption storage and electronic
health record systems.
1. Cloud-based encryption storage services like SpiderOak[32], which offers
a remote encrypted backup folder which is synchronized across all of the
user’s registered devices. The user may explicitly share specific files with
other users or groups via web link. Application such as BoxCryptor[21]
and Truecrypt[33] add client-side encryption which is then hosted on stor-
age services such as Dropbox[40], iCloud[41] and many more [22]. These
systems are not designed for the EHR but claim to be very secure. How-
ever, the security require placing of trust on the services.
2. Electronic Health record system like Microsoft HealtVault[24], which offer
a easy storage and access for health record from virtually any device. The
health-professionals using it may explicitly share specific information in
the heath record, or the complete record with different users or group by
giving them appropriate permissions. Systems like these fall short of the
security requirements defined in earlier section.
The Table A.2 in appendix, shows a brief summary of the features implemented
by a number of applications. In particular, it also notes the cryptographic algo-
rithms and mechanisms used. We noticed during the study that while many of
the applications provide adequate security using either symmetric or asymmet-
ric system(PKI) they relay heavily on trusting a third-party for cryptographic
key-management.
4 Proposed Solution
For a system to satisfy the confidentiality requirement, all the operations on the
system must take place on the end device. These operations include changing,
adding and securing the data before being sent to the storage server. This re-
quires that the encryption key be used on the device without having the need to
store the said key. A solution to this requires a key stretching algorithm which
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allows users to use passwords they are comfortable with without any restrictions.
There are many key stretching algorithms including scrypt[9], bycrypt[10]
and PBKDF2[8] which output an arbitrary length key based on the password de-
fined by the user. Due to the inherent nature of key stretching functions, even
a smaller password (e.g. 4 character) would keep the encrypted data secure.
Having smaller password has the additional benefit of being easy to remember
and reduces the risk of the user having to memorize complex passwords.
As the system is expected to be accessed directly from the browser of any
device, it must not require a high amount of computation; thus we recommend
using PBKDF2 which is relatively cheap in terms of computation and memory
with respect to others. One important parameter of PBKDF2 is the salt, using
which prevents generation of the same key for the same user passwords. In or-
der to have strong derived key, the salt is to be generated on the server using a
Cryptographic Random Number Generator (CRNG) and stored on the server.
The reason for generation of the salt on server lies in the open question about
the performance of CRNG over current mobile platforms. This salt will be sent
back to the user device whenever the user attempts to login and must be unique
for each user.
Using the PBKDF2 derived output as key for symmetric cipher such as AES
the data can be securely encrypted. Other ciphers can also be used in-place of
AES including asymmetric or hybrid schemes depending on the targeted device.
The key size of the derived PBKDF2 output is recommended to be minimum of
128-bits. Using 128-bits has been proven to be as secure as using 192 or 256-bits
[17].
Authentication of the user is also an important aspect to distinguish be-
tween legitimate and illegitimate users. Requiring the server to generate and
store a unique cryptographic salt for each user is one of the effective and feasible
ways to ensure the authentication of the user at a moment and also in the future.
It is known that mistyped passwords by users could potentially make the
system decrypt the data into gibberish. A problem here is that users might fail
to notice this and update or enter some information, encrypt it using a wrong
password and save it to the database. This would potentially render all the
data useless. Such scenario may happen during an emergency health situation,
where the medical user might create new data using wrong password, poten-
tially rendering the earlier data useless without noticing. It is not possible for
the encryption key to be available on the server for verification, hence a cryp-
tographic hashing function would be used. Cryptographic hashes are functions
which cannot retrieve the input to the function given its output. It is recom-
mended to use SHA to generate a ”verification hash” from the encryption key.
This verification hash is to be stored on the server, as it is impossible to derive
the encryption key from the verification hash. This hash is then transmitted to
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the client along with the encrypted data, which can verify that the password is
the correct one. If it is, then the password (and, thereby, the encryption key)
is correct, and decryption can proceed correctly.
One final concern was that a user might forget or lose their password. Three
solutions are proposed for this problem:
1. The use of an escrow service. This service could be provided a copy of
the password, the encryption key, and verification hash which itself will be
encrypted. However, it would not have access to the database which stores
the encrypted data and salt. Access to which requires different username
and password.
2. Using trusted third party to store a copy of encryption key which will be
retrieved during key-recovery.
3. Storing the copy of encryption key on the server that is also encrypted
using another encryption key. This step requires the user to remember
atleast two different passwords, the second password can be replaced to
set of security questions that in general are used to retrieve password.
This solution requires the re-encryption of all the previous data stored on
the server.
The solution of key-escrow has been examined by Schneier et al. [11] who
strongly recommended against it for key recovery due to issues including op-
erational costs, complexity of maintaining such system and trade-offs among
others. Since the main goal is to reduce the use of third party, we recommend
the last proposed solution to be implemented in the system.
5 Design and Protocols
This section visualizes the message exchanges between the user and the server
during the initial key generation, data exchange and password recovery.
The notations used in the diagrams are the following:
• Salt = $
• K1 = Main encryption key
• K2 = Second wrapping key, used to encrypt the K1 and stored on server.
Retrieved when password change request is initiated.
• PWD and PWD2 = Main password and password for recovery (or set of
security answers to some questions), respectively.
• PWDn = Different/changed password
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• KC = Key Cipher i.e. encryption of the main key which will be stored
on server.
• ǫ = Wrong password
• KDF = Key Deriving functions i.e. PBKDF2
Each diagram represents the different phase of the system. First diagram visu-
alizes the initial key generation when the user logins in the first time; the second
shows a normal data exchange between user and server and the last shows the
exchanges done during the key recovery.
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User Server
Request Salt
Verify user
Compute Salt $
Store salt in database
Send Salt $
K1 = KDF ($ + PWD)
K2 = KDF ($ + PWD2)
KC = AESK2(K1)
Send the encrypted KC to store in database
Time
Data* = AESK1 (Data)
Send encrypted Data* to server
msc Key Generation
Figure 1: Key Generation
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User Server
REQ{Data∗}||Salt$
Data∗||SaltUser
K1 = KDF ($ + PWD)
Data = AESK1 (Data*)
Time
Data* = AESK1 (Data)
Send encrypted Data*
msc Data Exchange
Figure 2: Data Exchange
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User Server
REQ{Data∗}||Salt$
Data∗||SaltUser
Kǫ = KDF ($ + ǫ)
Dataǫ = AESKǫ (Data*)
Checksum/Hash mismatch
Request password recovery key
Send KC
K2 = KDF ($ + PWD2)
K1 = AESK2(KC)
Data = AESK1 (Data*)
K1 = KDF ($ + PWDn)
K2 = KDF ($ + PWD2)
KC = AESK2(K1)
Send the new encypted KC to store in database
Data* = AESK1 (Data)
Sends the re-encrypted Data* to server
msc Password Recovery/Change of Password
Figure 3: Password/Key change
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6 Evaluating the proposed solution
6.1 Performance Testing
A high iteration count in the PBKDF protects the derived key against brute-
force attacks by stretching the potentially weak password. The higher number
of iterations, the harder it becomes for the adversary to brute force the key.
In order to determine the number of iterations over different devices, we con-
ducted benchmarking test using Javascript libraries including Anandam PBKDF2[37],
Stanford JavaScript library (SJCL)[39] and crytp-js[38]. Table 1 summarizes
the number of iterations possible for the PBKDF2 in 500 ms on average. The
benchmarks of Android considers both the available browsers Google Chrome
and Firefox.
Table 1: PBKDF2 Benchmarks
PC iOS iPad Android Least
Anamadan 25000000 10000000 50000000 16666667/10000000 10000000
crypt-js 24097 642 657 687/612 252
Stanford 347222 6693 86029 69000/67000 6693
The basic idea of using PBKDF2 is to make the hash function very slow
meaning that even when using a fast GPU or custom hardware, brute-force
attacks time will have negligible effect. The main purpose of using this is to
make the hash function slow enough to evade these attacks, but still keep it fast
enough to not cause a noticeable delay for the user. As such with the results
derived from the benchmarking, the Stanford library provides a ’good’ amount
of iterations in a small time making it the ideal choice for use over various plat-
forms.
We also studied the benchmarking for AES, which is the recommended al-
gorithm for encryption of the data. The results of AES (in Tables 2,3,4 and
5)indicate both the encryption and decryption time taken by the schemes for
the particular library. Each table shows results of specific devices using different
available browsers. For the plaintext, we used a 1.2 MB randomly generated
text file, the reason for using the big file was to get an approximation of com-
putation taken by any device when a user starts the key change process either
due to having forgotten the password or having desire change of it. Since all
the devices were easily able to handle the task of encryption and decryption of
a big file, it proves that in the situation of a change in key, it would not be
infeasible to perform re-encryption reasonably fast. We used different libraries
like jcryption[34], moveable[35] and pidcrypt[36].
The following parameters were used for AES benchmarking:
1. Key size: 128 bits
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2. Block size: 64
3. Plaintext: 1.2 MB randomly generated text file with letters, special sym-
bols and numbers
There are other modes of operations [5] for AES but they were not used
for testing due to various reasons; Electronic Code Book (ECB) due to its dis-
advantage of being deterministic when plaintext is the same; Galios Contour
Mode (GCM) due to it having each operation based on a 128-bit multiplication
in the Galois field per each block, which requires higher computational power
each time; EAX would theoretically be the ideal choice for the project but due
to its unavailability in JavaScript, testing it was not feasible. It must able be
noted that the library pidcrypt fails to execute on both the mobile platforms
and hence should be avoided if the targeted devices includes mobile device.
Table 2: AES - PC
PC Chrome Firefox Opera Internet Explorer
Enc Dec Enc Dec Enc Dec Enc Dec
cryptojs 1068 1316 1337 1384.8 1221.6 1458.2 2642 1730
stanford 503.6 547 335.4 565.6 614 550.6 513.4 824.4
jcryption 1068 1351 1198.4 1172.6 1006 1338.8 1147.6 1147.8
moveable 1069.8 1257 1253 1145.4 945.4 1291.6 1156.2 1165.4
pidcrypt 2128 3477.4 7229.6 10699.2 2303.8 3580 2342.8 3768.4
Table 3: AES Android
Android Chrome Firefox
Encryption Decryption Encryption Decryption
cryptojs 2910 2808 3275 3506
stanford 1374 1596 1032 1249
jcryption 2466 3359 2037 2046
moveable 2606 2626 1711 14383
pidcrypt - - - -
Table 4: AES iPad
iPad Chrome Safari
Encryption Decryption Encryption Decryption
cryptojs 18937 28861 4353 4560
stanford 5887 7557 1442 1779
jcryption 27161 26454 3821 3826
moveable 26423 28213 3666 3935
pidcrypt 31079 36451 18358 20097
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Table 5: AES iPhone
iPhone Safari
Encryption Decryption
cryptojs 11806 12942
stanford 3532 4849
jcryption 12269 12538
moveable 7865 10151
pidcrypt - -
6.2 Security Testing
The system consists of two main components, the first one being the PBKDF2
and the other AES. In order to test the security of the system, we mounted an
attack on the PBKDF2 as a compromise to this component would lead to com-
promise of the whole system. Additionally, the AES has already been proven
secure by various researchers [12].
For our demonstration we made some assumptions: The adversary has com-
plete knowledge of the parameters of key derivation function, salt, derived key
length and a pair of ciphertext and its corresponding plaintext. During our
testing we set the number of iterations as 1000, salt to be 128 bit hex and the
derived key length to be 128 bits.
The adversary then tries to derive a key from the known parameters, either
using some dictionary or generating each possible string as password. The com-
putational power available to the adversary will determine the amount of time
it takes to brute force the key. For testing, we used a normal computer with 2.3
GHz processor which was able to check approximately 5000 hashes per second
i.e, 5 password per second.
During our testing we were able to derive a formula that provides with ap-
proximation of the effort needed by the adversary to derive the key. The effort1
here is the amount of resource and the time available with the adversary. For
the formula, some assumptions must be made: firstly, one needs to think in
terms of the hardware an adversary will be using and secondly we define each
available core as a unit. This is due to the inherent nature of the PBKDF2
which cannot be computed in parallel2. In order to simplify the calculation we
assume that one unit i.e. core can test approximately 100 passwords per second.
A typical keyboard has 26 lower-case, 26 upper-case, 10 numbers, 32 sym-
bols, and space; which equals to 95 characters. The number of passwords for
a given size, say S, and a specific password length n is denoted as Sn. The
1effort = resource × time
2A clever adversary can spread the computation over several cores
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adversary has 10,000 cores at disposal.
Summarizing, there are 95 character for password (S), a single core can test
100 password per second (rate), the password of length (n) and the adversary
has 100,000 cores he can use per year (effort).
Sn = rate × effort
n = logS(rate × effort)
=
⌈
log(rate × effort)
log(S)
⌉
=
⌈
log(100× (10, 000× 3× 107))
log(95)
⌉
= 7
(1)
Summarizing the result we assume that an adversary has 10,000 cores which
is used to generate 100 PBKDF2 keys per second, then for a 7 length password
consisting of any letters, it would take approximately one year to brute force
it. Conclusively, even for password of length as short as 4, it offers security
that can stand brute forcing for more than a year provided that the adversary
is restricted to normal computing resource3.
7 Discussion and Conclusion
During our initial research, we learned that are some systems which permit the
encryption and decryption at the browser end, but all of them lack the option
of recovering/changing the password/key. Additionally, most of these systems
requires trusting third-party to manage the key. The description of our system
is targeted towards protecting record data while allowing the feature to easily
change the associated password/key.
An important note is that this system is only intended to protect data from
misuse on the server side of the system. This is intended to be used as a part
of a larger system which provides user authentication, access logs, and other
protections against unauthorized access from clients.
This system was devised for the encryption of protected health information
and its storage. While this paper discussed the model of the system, many
points must be taken in consideration when implementing it. Along with the
points mentioned below, the details in[19] must be strongly considered.
3This resource is a normal high-end commercial computer
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7.1 Recommended good practices
7.1.1 Salt Reuse
Using the same salt for each hash can lead to complex problem. Usage of same
salt may happen either due the salt being constant i.e, it is hard-coded in the
program or it is generated randomly only once. This is very ineffective as if
same salt are used with same common password, they will output the same
hash. An adversary then can use a reverse lookup table attack to brute force
through every hash at the same time. They just have to apply the salt to each
guessed password before its hashed. If the salt is hard-coded in the code then
the lookup tables and rainbow tables can be built for that salt, to make it easier
to crack hashes generated by the product later-on. A new random salt must
be generated each time a user creates an account or changes their password. It
must always be unique per user.
7.1.2 Short Salt
Using short salt would lead to an adversary building a lookup table for each
possible combination of salt and guessed password. To make it impossible for
an adversary to create a lookup table, the salt must be long. A good practise
is to use a salt that is the same size as the output of the hash function. For
example, when using SHA-256 which is of 256 bits the salt must be atleast of
256 bits; for SHA-512, 512 bits and so on. It is highly recommended against
using the MD5 and SHA-1 due to its relatively easy collisions for two inputs[20].
7.1.3 Cryptographic Random Generator
The generation of the salt on the server side must be cryptographically random.
Using a random salt makes it less feasible to brute-forcing a single password
which will not be the case when the salt is predictable. The generated salt
while random must also be long enough to protect the password from rainbow
tables. Use of small or even blank password can make it vulnerable to hash
look-up tables. These tables contain the common list of passwords along with
its hash values stores against them which means that if the salt is either small or
blank the adversary just has to check the generated hash against the password
in the table.
7.2 Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented a secure model for applications dealing with
e-Health that uses only client-side encryption to prevent sensitive data from
being available to anyone other than the user.
The proposed solution allows the possibility of changing the password in the
event of forgetting the password without placing trust on third party services
or requiring high computation effort. We did not find this to be implemented
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in any of the systems currently available. The system was developed taking in
consideration that it will be accessed from browsers of devices which has limited
memory and computation resources.
7.3 Future Work
From all the requirements presented in this paper, our proposed system satisfies
all of them besides the authorized sharing. Implementing group sharing schemes
on the JavaScript is a challenge and something to consider for future work.
For example, implementing some of the group sharing algorithms like attribute
based sharing[15], would allow sharing of the sensitive data within specific users
while keeping the security intact and work on device browsers, developing an
innovative way to inform the user if the same data already exists in the server
after which he can request access to that data from the original creator of that
data.
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Table A.2: Comparison Table
